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The Real Estate Recovery Fund:
Stewart Title Guar. Co. v Park, 2001
Roger Bernhardt
Stewart Title Guar. Co. v Park (9th Cir 2001) 250 F3d 1249
Stewart Title Guaranty (Stewart) insured several lenders who lent money to property owners
seeking to refinance existing loans through a mortgage broker (broker). The broker acted as
escrow holder for the refinancings. As escrow agent, the broker was required to pay off the
existing loans so that the new loans would be secured by first deeds of trust. On receiving the
refinance funds for the escrow account, the broker embezzled the loan proceeds instead of
paying off the existing liens. The title policy obligated Stewart to protect its insureds (the new
lenders) against loss of priority. When the new lenders filed claims under the policies, Stewart
paid off the senior liens, thus becoming subrogated to the rights of the new lenders.
As subrogee, Stewart sued the broker and obtained a default judgment exceeding $1.2 million.
When the broker failed to pay the judgment, Stewart applied to the state Department of Real
Estate (DRE) for payment from the California Real Estate Recovery Fund (Fund) (Bus & P C
§§10470–10481). When the DRE denied Stewart’s application, Stewart sought a court order
directing payment out of the Fund. The district court denied Stewart’s claim.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Fund exists to “protect the public against loss resulting from
misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty by real estate brokers who are unable to respond
to damage awards.” 250 F3d at 1252. To recover from the Fund, the applicant must be an
“aggrieved person” within the meaning of Bus & P C §10471(a) and must have diligently tried to
collect from all liable persons in the transaction. A California court has defined “aggrieved
person” as a client of the defrauding broker or a member of the general public. Because Stewart
Title was neither the broker’s client nor a member of the public, it had no direct right of recovery
from the Fund. The court held (250 F3d at 1255):
The [Fund] is a limited fund of last resort created by the California legislature to protect
members of the public who would otherwise have no recourse against unscrupulous real estate
professionals. Title insurance companies were not intended by the California legislature to be
“aggrieved parties” as that term is used in [Bus & P C §10471(a)].
Alternatively, Stewart argued that it was entitled to payment from the Fund as a subrogee of
the aggrieved persons here (namely, the borrowers and new lenders). The court held that Stewart
had no subrogation right because it was obligated under its policy to compensate the new lenders
for their loss and, in turn, the new lenders were precluded from recovery from the Fund until
they had pursued collection from all other liable persons. Once Stewart made the new lenders
whole, there was no right of recovery to which Stewart could be subrogated. Thus, the DRE and
the trial court properly denied Stewart’s claim for payment from the Fund.
THE EDITOR’S TAKE: Had a private insurance carrier refused to pay on the grounds
successfully asserted here by the State Recovery Fund, my guess is that it might have been held
liable for bad faith denial of coverage. The Fund has put itself in the enviable position of refusing
to pay the primary party because it has not yet gone after some secondary party, while also

refusing to pay the secondary party who compensated the primary party because it was not itself
the primary party. Those are pretty formidable barriers to recovery from the Fund.
The first horn of the defense is pretty secure because statute clearly requires the primary
victim to first seek recovery from “all other persons liable to the claimant in the transaction.”
Bus & P C §10471(c)(7)(E). It is the second horn—that even a subrogee (who was not itself a
wrongdoer) cannot qualify as an “aggrieved person”—that I regard as based more on policy than
on a technical reading of the Real Estate Recovery Act.
Nonetheless, it is hard to understand how this could have happened without some negligence
on Stewart Title’s part. It certainly should not have insured a lender’s lien priority unless it had
sufficient control over the loan escrow as to make sure that the transaction was done correctly,
i.e., that the senior lien was satisfied, that there were no intervening liens, and that the new lien
was properly recorded, as well as making sure that the loan funds were transmitted to the
borrower. From the meager statement of facts in the opinion, it appears that none of these steps
occurred.
Generally, title insurers don’t indemnify mortgage lenders until they are certain that an actual
loss has really occurred. If the insured’s mortgage lien turns out to be in second position rather
than first, you can bet that the title company won’t offer money until it has been established that
this lower priority results in a cash loss to the lender. After all, even second mortgages
sometimes get paid.
In this case, the loss was pretty obvious: It appears that the lenders got no lien at all on the
properties (no mortgages seem to have been recorded, and even if they had, they were not
supported by enforceable loans because the borrowers never received the funds). Nor, for the
same reasons, could the lenders recover anything from the intended borrowers (except in the
unlikely case that the loan broker was the borrowers’ agent, making them responsible for his
conduct).
But what about all that fine print in the policy? Isn’t there a clause somewhere that requires
the insured to seek recovery from the loan broker (or the Fund, as the broker’s insurer)? More
interestingly, if no such clause is there now, will there be one as a result of this decision? Will
title insurers require their insureds to exhaust their remedies against their brokers first (possibly
paying the litigation expenses for such actions) before they themselves have to pay? And, if so,
could that include proceeding against the Fund? After all, the collateral-source rule says that
insurance coverage generally does not bar recovery from a tortfeasor or his insurer, unless the
Fund Act language is treated as repealing that rule in this context. Because the title company
cannot recover from the Fund as a subrogee, it makes sense for it to demand that its insured do
for it what it cannot do for itself.
If title policies start to say such things, insureds may find themselves truly in a hard place: The
Fund may say it won’t pay until after they have recovered from their title insurer, while their
insurer may say that it won’t pay until after they have recovered from the Fund. Oh, the trouble
crooked brokers make for us all! —Roger Bernhardt

